

1977 IGR

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FOR RELEASE.**

6 AMTRUNK operation starting in 1963 sought to develop a capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could not the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to the CIA.

little concrete progress during JFK's life
in 1965 CIA withdrew from its assoc. because
believed to be compromised

basic ? about security some conception
due to involvement of personalities who
^{are} suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies,
including possibly having been foreign agents

IGR speculates that it is unlikely (AMTRUNK)
to develop any role until long after
JFK's death suggests that it is unlikely
to have provoked Castro at that time to use
assass in retaliation

7 a full review of the operation shows that
prior to the President's assassination
not only had the CIA not agreed to give
any support to AMTRUNK / 1, but had re-
jected his proposals to assassinate
"Castro"

8 L. R. CHIRK believed about the relationship
between AMTRUNK / 1 and 2 / 10 for would have

7 known only that there was an inconclusive association that clearly had not progressed to the point that it constitutes the base for the postulated provocation"

IPR doesn't deny possibility that actual CIA plotting w/ enormous significance which may have provided CASTRO w/ postulated provocation for the JFK assassination

Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment

8 reference to reported 5-hour delay of a Cubana airline flight from Mexico City, awakens arrival of mysterious passengers

* see file on Hilberto Polanco LOPEZ

IPR says flight on ground only 4-hrs + it departed 1 hr before alleged arrival of the private aircraft

FBI investigated another man ^{as IPR reported} who departed on another Cubana flight - info was added for use in SSC report (somewhat), "a single report that caused him to be dramatized as a full of errors as to be highly suspect"

also SSC emphasis in cable from Mex City station replying to 11/23/63 inquiry from CIA HQ asking for info on collection of information

cable DIR 84885, 28-11-63 1141035
MEXI 7045 (IN 67281)

24 November 1963

IPR reply for the meeting 11/24/63 6:00 met

8 as having contact w/ the Soviets but
9 as the subject of a December 1960 meeting
between ~~fundamental~~ of Cuban Embassy w/ a
Soviet, concerning press conference to be held
by AMKASH/1 in Feb + March 1961

X "On any event, the meeting in December
1960 was prior to President Kennedy's
inauguration, which removes it yet
further from any possible relevance to the
subject matter. It really is not difficult
to understand why ~~the~~ the reference to
AMKASH/1's name did not lead to detailed
research about him."

2 gen'l conclusions

① "The SSC Final Report contains
numerous factual errors, both
in the extensive treatment of a
selected operation (AMKASH) and in
a number of separate incidents that
it presents."

② "while ~~one~~^{can} make the point
in principle that the Warren
Commission could have well
broadened its review to include
the anti-Cuban programs
of the U.S. Government, in trying to
make the case for that concept
Book II of the SSC Final Report
does not do so, though it
attempts to do so in its
part on the subject. It is difficult to
characterize it as generally

11

"it would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission's) efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (or, normal avenues of investigation). CIA, too, could have counselled in specific terms what most saw then in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt - as they obviously did - that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review.

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"it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964

TAB B: CIA Pay. on the Inquiry

2. b. SSC report, to considerable extent describes AM-ASH operation inaccurately. "The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK, in order to support its ^{case} SSC was ^{not} should have been reported to the WC

c. question of aircraft flights on 11/22 & 11/24/62 to Havana
see "Unidentified Air Passengers" ~~file~~ folder

Travel to & fr USSR 1959-1962

11/26/63 Cable DIR 85133, 26. 11. 63

sent to Paris, Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London & Ottawa - requesting any scrap info which bears on JFK's assassination

replies on 11/27/63:

HELS 2299 (IN 68739), ~~22~~ 11/27/63

ROME 1235 (IN 68802) "

OTTA 1275 (IN 69005) "

COPE 3469 (IN 69011) "

LOND 6097 (IN 69100) "

OTTA 1277 (IN 69233) 11/11/63

OSLO 4490 (IN 69290) "

MADR 9789 (IN 69328) 11/28/63

BRUS 8731 (IN 69352) 11/29/63

ROME 1235 (IN 69100) "

PARI 1710 (IN 6914239) 12/18/63

PARI 1833 (IN 6917148) 12/10/63

PARI 1715 (IN 6917317) "

LOND 6097 (IN 69100) 11/27/63

- 4 London reported that British journalist claimed that when imprisoned in Cuba in 1959 - Santos (happened), lives in luxury in jail, Santos visited frequently by the American garbage lady

OTTA 1277 (IN 69233) 11/27/63

Ottawa reported delight of Cuban embassy staff over JFK death & instructions from govt to cease looking happy in public

OSLO 4490 (IN 69290) 11/27/63

Oslo reported Soviets shocked - blame assn on extreme right wing

Other than above, initial responses produced no other info

11/29/63 DIR 85973 query to Hague & Frankfurt on Oswald's travel back to USSR

12/2/63 DIR 86077, query to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn & The Hague

BONN 5579 (FN 73338) 12/4/63

HAGU 5116 (FN 73378) "

MUNI 8316 (FN 75065) 12/6/63

STUT 5545 (FN 75758) 12/9/63

ESNT 1400 12/9/63

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above reporting produced details about Oswald's travel from USSR thru Germany & Netherlands to the US in June 1963

5 No evidence found through these queries
& related queries tying the S.O. to Oswald's
associates of JFK

II Oswald Mexico Visit Sept Oct 1963

Oswald to Mex City on 11/28/63 DIR 85655

"We have by no means excluded the
possibility that other as yet unknown
persons may have been involved or
even that other powers may have
played a role. Please continue all your
coverage of Soviet and Cuban Envoys
and your liaison w/ Mexicans

6 DIR 86064 30.11.63 11/30/63

Please follow all leads & tips - Question
if Oswald acted alone not fully resolved

DIR 88680 12/12/63

Continue watch of Soviets & Cubans for complaints,
propagandizing about the case. "FYI only,
Soviet Intel in India had letter sent
to (U.S. Government) leaders demanding
full investigation of case."

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HMMW-12193, 17.12.16 17.17/63

7 HQ forwarded dispatch to Mex City section
commending them on job well done

"Your LFKVOY data, the statements of
Sylvia Dahl, and your analyses were
major factors in the final clarification
of the case, blunting out the really
ominous specter of 'foreign backing'"

III Gen'l Collection Requirements

7 DIR 84603, 22, 11, 63

all CIA stations abroad get cable from HQ saying look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. — Be on quick alert while new Pres. takes over the reins"

8 "Were there relevant or significant information on the subject of JFK assassination & Oswald? It would have been reported either in response to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources"

If one believes that there was a conspiracy, w/ Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, it is obvious

9 ~~that~~ would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to prove, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken."

comment in HQ dispatch to Mex City Sta on 12/17/63 — TMM MW-12193, 17.12.63 re limited reporting from other stations
"... this is partly dictated by the facts of the assassination..."

in comment to the report, citing Oswald's initial alleged activities in Cuba, JFK says that

9. There were no penetrations of CASTRO's inner circle where any info on subject (JFK assassination) would exist.
10. However, assets in Cuba did have reporting requirements.

III. Unpursued Leads

re Cuban airline flights + mystery passenger see file on Gilberto Policarpio LOPEZ

11. Flight of 11/22 + 11/25 to Cuba from Mex. City were passenger flights -
Flight of 11/27 appears to have been a cargo flight w/ 1 passenger - the man referred to in Book II SSC.

CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cuban flights, filing cable reports to HQ.
CIA had surveillance team, so did the Mexicans. When provided photos of passports, + ^{copies} passenger list.

- + Also have LIEN VOY telephone tap against Cuban Embassy, of transcripts of conversations w/ Cuban office + Mexican Airport Control Office.

11/22 / 1963 FLIGHT

Took L. of SSC report + later CIA could not explain, at time SSC looking at why someone followed up on 11/22/63 flight. In fact, the SSC was advised.

SECRET

12. that the Mexican authorities were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject.

13. "The report (of 5 hour delay of Cubana flight for Mex City to Havana on 11/22/63) in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its summary of the matter."

The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight
in CIA passing report to FBI & FBI not

15. doing followup investigation for WC
ISR's list of inaccuracies in SSC report in this position

1) Mex City Sta did not able HQ that man looked suspicious. There was a 12/5/63 cable MEXI-7253 (IN 74227) which reported the man had crossed at Laredo, Texas on 11/23/63, what registered at hotel in Mex City on 11/25, checked out of hotel on 11/27/63 & was only passenger on Cubana flight that night - good photo of him taken at airport 11/11/1963

2) dispatches followed HAMA-22571, 12/4/63 reporting info & summaries for the benefit of continuing following.

"Source states the timing and circumstances of the man's travel through Mexico are as follows for the man's travel."

15 also internal memo in Mex Cy
see Memorandum for the Record, 12/3/63
which stated that the man was
reported to have "looked suspicious"

16 Monterey Base Cable 3/19/64
MNTY - 0829 (IN 43193) - info
on Cuban American on 11/27/63 flight
had by agent of Mexican federales

" The following should be noted about
the report: it misspelled the
man's name; it offered a bare state-
ment that he "was involved in the
Kennedy assassination"; it states
that he entered Mexico "on foot"
from Laredo, Texas (according to the
SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded
that he entered by automobile); it
asserts that he stayed at the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico Cy (while the date
and times of his registration and check-
out at a specific hotel in Mexico
Cy, where he stayed, were known); it
gave an incorrect number for his passport;
and, it stated that his Mexican tourist
card was issued in Nuevo Laredo, (when
it was known to have been issued in
Tampa, Florida). "

11111944

17 Mex Cy to Monterey
Monterey cable contributed to confusion in the
process. When Mex Cy to Monterey
was not properly handled, confusion resulted.

17 Cr MEXI - 8740 (IN 43940) 3/20/64
that the information in Monterey
report "jibes fully w/ that provided
Station by Mex cy source 4 December
6:30"

"The mistake of that cable cannot
be explained today, but wrong
it obviously was."

"Implicit criticism of CIA's not
collecting more info. on the man is
not well founded. It had no
real sources w/ access to info
concerning him; when a defector from
Cuba became available I passed
information he was queried and the
results were provided the authorities."

TAB C CIA Operations against CUBA

4 "While CIA produced considerable
material for the investigation (see Tab E)
that more was not reported is a measur-
ful indication what was known (then
by those actually involved (in Cuban
operations & supply of info to W.C.), as
distinguished from what might be hypo-
thesized at a later date. To contend
to the contrary - which has been
suggested by some - would require a
list of names & a description of many CIA
employees, employees of CIA, many of
whom know nothing of the most
basic facts of the case."

7 Operation AMTRUNK see Folder No. 7 -
Operations to Split
CASTRO regime; (AMTRUNK
operation)

{ Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez
{ Enrique Cayardo Robles

Cuban spies - developed operational
concept to overthrow
the CASTRO govt - known
as the Leonardo Plan

8 Moreno assoc'd in Miami

Jorge Agbunzyc Volsky
Cuban citizen of polish origin

married Cuban national after WWII
reportedly imprisoned following Bo. P. govt
reportedly work Castroite

Leonardo Plan was discussed w/ Ad Szulc
Szulc claimed to govt contacts - it was
through his intercession that Leonardo
Plan gained govt-level support & approval

↓ Richard Goodwin was Szulc contact at W. H.
Volsky & Szulc met Robert Hurwicz

1. State Dept official to discuss the
plan - he presented the idea to CIA

CIA assigned it to Miami Station &
became known as AMTRUNK

→ 4/17/63 - Szulc tells Hurwicz that Miami Station gave
Volsky security to handle Castroite operations not
considered official work

9 Early Sept 1963 - AMTRUNK had 3 intelligence
sources in Cuba

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1. Theodor S. ...

2. ...

3. ...

... reportedly close to AMTRUNK

- 10 Oct '63 - decision made to separate Moreno from operational details of AMTRUNK because of indiscretion + poor security practice

By Nov 1963 - some persons successfully recruited in Cuba but no progress in establishing a any capabilities fraction

- 11 Szulc + Volsky considered to be highly suspect - re security considerations

- 12 also Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunes
Castro had Rabel set up Cuban

- 13 Maurice Lage - held job until 1960 when apptd Chief of Rural Housing, defected to US in 1962 - recruited by JMWAVE Sta + used in AMTRUNK activities - returned to Cuba on his own in 1965. Was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison but set free in July or August of 1967.

"There were accusations that RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven."

- 14 FGR Days - very little planning + much progress in AMTRUNK during FGR's life

111107

New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

14

15 "While Onta (Juan) was reported in early 1961 as being used in CIA-syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationship w/ him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of info. on the Cuban Leadership."

16

17 It is pertinent to note that in addition to Sturgis's reported role in Castro got re gamblers, Onta's availability for assassin attempt was understood to be due his last payoff to he had received from gamblers interest. "One can deduce that Sturgis and Onta could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts w/ the men heading the gambling orgs."

18

see vol 19
CIA report

18 "It is possible that Varona ^{7 Dec. 1961} already was involved in independent operations w/ the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination. ^{Varona}

1111948

As late as 6/10/64 - it was reported that these gamblers ^{offshore} were ⁱⁿ the crime ^{officers} ^{by} ^{law} ^{enforcement} ^{authorities} when approached by Roselli.

2/ Considerations:

2. Frank Sturges may have had contact w/ crim syndicate. Could have been used by syndicate in its activities.

2. H_2O Vapor \rightarrow Cond. $\text{C}_{17}\text{H}_{35}\text{O}_2$

[illegible]

Agent Messages re 61 re Castro assassination

26 5 agent messages made reference to plan to kill Castro or preparing same. 3 related to same operation, 2 were separate proposals. No indication that these resulted from separate CIA initiative. LA Division prepared summary of messages forwarded to Review Staff on 8/8/75. Records of Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. Subject not covered in Church Committee interim report.

27 B messages: relate to same plan
(1st) 3/27/61 sent by agency asset AMBRONC/S re-proposes sabotage of electric company in Havana - coordinate w/ attempt to kill Castro at public appearance (as in accordance w/ Gen'l Plan) no record of message answered
(2nd) 3/29/61 - AMBRONC/S sends 2nd message plan scheduled for 4/9/61 message answered on 3/30 agreeing to plan - addressed Gen'l issue but didn't commit on proposal to kill Castro

(3rd) 4/5/61 - presumably from AMBRONC/S +1111950 person he had been directed to contact only, no discussion for 5 months. Says this was not 4/9/61 plan. Would make it impossible to maintain this to the very end in Cuba

The 4 agents named in plan

28

- ① AMBROW/5 - a) 201 file opened on 5/15/60
 POA issued 12/18/61
 OA issued 1/31/62
 debriefing on Nov 1960 -
 indicates that he had contact
 w/ plotters against CASTRO &
 claimed to have attempted to
 make ~~some~~ ^{similar} plans. Infiltrated
 on 12/9/60 - exfiltrated
 on 2/15/61

(b) infiltrated

3/3/61

exfiltrated

6/19/61

Sold mission to org. resistance

groups

(c) infiltrated

12/17/61

exfiltrated

3/29/62

still same mission

(d) infiltrated

5/2/62

arrested 5/29/62 & executed 8/30/62

reported to never admit was CIA agent

name not in McGovern's book given by Castro

11111351

- ② AMCOAX/1 - AMBROW/5 asked to contact
 him re gen'l plan for 4/61

a) POA - 1/5/61

mission to org. resistance

active in Cuba

infiltrated

6/61

exfiltrated

6/7/61

following D.P.

29

29 (b) reinfilitrated

7/29/61 same mission
arrested

8/17/61 - serving 30 year term
in Mc Given's book

(3) AMR06/1 - another AMBRONC contact
for 4/61 plan

a) recruited in 9/60 & infiltrated then
received androps in 12/60
returned to U.S. 5/15/61 following B.P.

b) infiltrated

6/29/61 - mission to org resistance
groups
& conduct sabotage

arrested 7/61 & 30 year term
name in Mc Given book

30 (DAMPANIL/7 - another AMBRONC 4/61 contact

a) was a 'walk-in' on 4/15/60

POA - 1/30/61

MOC since 8/12/60

mission to org. Resistance in
Havana & Pinar del Rio

b) infiltrated 3/3/61

arrested 4/23/61 - 30 year term

in Mc Given book

c) was infiltrated on 8/60

infiltrated 11/60

(prior to POA) 11111952

mission was sabotage & assass
of prominent Cuban Communist
members in Havana & Pinar del Rio
also sabotage of government
in Cuba at that time

Highly effective, working with great efficiency
in the field as a member of the AMBRONC organization

TAB D AMLASH OPERATION

1. 1977 ER says actual nature & sign. of AMLASH was much diff. than Book II

Book II suggests that AMLASH may have been Castro agent w/ provocation mission that would justify US retaliation ~ in alternative Amlash was a security risk by which details of plotting could have become known to Castro, providing some provocation & whatever the reasoning Amlash should have been reported to W.C.

"We believe that neither these apply. The character of the relationship between CIA and Amlash/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy, was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for Amlash/1 to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against CASTRO. Whether one is inclined to see Amlash/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak."

As of Sept '63

5 Comment

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"It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a recruited agent at that time - he was the look for that matter, see ~ Operational Approval was never granted for this purpose. By the end of August 1962, the CIA relationship with AMLASH/1

5 had made no real progress, although
he was viewed as an operational con-
tact w/ potential. On a year passed
between August 1962 and September 1963
when he was next contacted by CIA.

On terms of the relationship that he had
w/ the CIA the critical period, for
purpose of the paper, is therefore between
5 September and 22 November 1963.

7 9/9/62 HQ cable to AMLAH case officer
~~report~~^{apparently} AMLAH as chief conspir-
ator allowed to recruit his own
cohorts among whom he may find
persons susceptible to long
distance & covert disruptions -
Cable also spell out long range
requirement prior to action based
on Amblash possible internal organiza-
tion

8 9/7/63 cable reporting first 63 meetings w/ Amblash
"Amblash still feels there only two ways
accomplish change either inside
job or invasion he realizes
enough realize latter out of question,
According AMWHP, Amblash still
awaiting for US reveal plan of action

37. Amblash's attitude towards the US
did not appear to be changing
in RMR and p. 4. Amblash's attitude
since 9/1/62 has been largely about change
and papering over the cracks of RMR.

10

"The fact remains that whatever views Amblask/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to Amblask/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing"

10/3/63 - Amblask case officer arrives in Paris to meet w/ Amblask. even tho Amblask told Amblship he does not "intend to see your friend again"

Station officer in Paris had been in contact w/ him, 2 of whom participated in meetings that followed

10/11/63 - case officer cable HQ that Amblask claimed to have "necessary people and equipment inside Cuba) to accomplish overthrow w/out (U.S.) assistance"

Amblask wanted meeting w/ RFK for moral support assurance. Cable indicates that Amblask determined to attempt operation against Castro w/ or w/out (U.S.) support

Ex. Fitzgibbon's memorandum to R.F.K. re: Amblask's personal meeting with R.F.K. and his request for U.S. support. It also contains a change of the subject from Cuba to Cuba

11 10/29/63 - Amblak meets w/ Fitzgerald
in Paris. Case officer also at
meeting

12 11/13/63 - Case officer memo summarizes
meeting of D.F. w/ Amblak
US support only after real corps
effected + group involved in position
to request U.S. support.
U.S. won't commit to isolated uprising

B D.F. in 1967 IER recalls that Amblak
repeatedly requested high powered rifle
w/ telescopic sights + other weapons to
kill Castro from a distance. D.F. stated
he rejected the request.
Case officer memo said nothing of operational
nature discussed at Fitzg. meeting

11/14/63 - Contact report of Amblak's meeting
in New York re Amblak's reaction
to 10/29 Fitzgerald meeting -
Amblak happy about policy but
not fact that wasn't given
technical assistance for
operational plan.

14 11/14/63 - If Amblak doesn't get advice
and materials from U.S. got
technician he will become
fed up + we'll lose progress
made

Comment Book II at p. 18 (11/19/66)
Amblak's feelings in Fitzg. meeting
as recalled by D.F. says the matter
is corroborated by above contact report

11/19/63 - Fitzg. approves telling Amblak
what he would be given a cache
inside Cuba, to include high
power rifle w/ scope

11/19/63 - Amblak tells CIA officer he plans
return to Cuba

11/20/63 - HQ calls Paris to delay
Amblak departure to permit
one more meeting which Amblak
requested

On same day, Amblak agrees
to delay departure
to delay of something inter-
esting. Case officer said couldn't
assure it but it was a meeting
Amblak requested.

16

IFR ^{sup} This is highly speculative
evidence of indication that Amblak
might receive specific support
he requested

11/22/63 - Case officer in Paris meets
w/ Amblak in afternoon

Conclusion

11. There is every indication ~~that~~ 1957 that
during President Kennedy's life
Amblak / I had no basis for believing
that he had CIA support for
much of anything. Were he a
professional spy going to Cuba,
or if he was merely a Cuban and
looking for a job, he had no
particular reason for being in Cuba,
any more than he had for being in
Paris.

Specific Sections of Book II

- 17 View of SSC as to why AMLAIT should have been examined by WC is stated at p 5 of the Report

EOB disagrees saying Amblak w/out substance prior to JFK's death

- 18 Incorrect to say CIA endorsed Amblak's proposal. No agreement w/ Amblak & a commitment to him and even if Castro learned of contacts w/ him there was nothing to learn beyond a fact of contact relationship was tenuous w/ no support promised to him for whatever he planned.

at p 68 SSC outlines position on significant plots

- 19 "we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility - not seriously considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry - that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed to the Amblak operation by the SSC Report."

41111952
"we tend to not put a general attention to the fact that a general could have been given by the Warren Commission to the fact that Castro program of the U.S. Government, including CIA, was not..."

19

p 4 P19

SSC Final Report - attribute
Fitzgerald saying that
U.S. would support a coup &

[gave gen'l assurance that
U.S. would help in bringing
about the coup

attributed to case officer testimony
which doesn't give w/ 1963 memo
on subject

20

ISK says Fitzgerald ^{assurance} support
contingent on if there is a
change in gov't in Cuba

- 21

re to CIA case officers who were
responsible for investigation
at time of WC - saying knowing
of Amblak operation would have

affected investigation - ISK says
" it is likely the views elicited

from CIA employees in 1975

probably were responsive to
representations by SSC staff

members as to what the operation
involved, as distinguished from
what it actually was "

21

Interview CIA officer re investigation
read Fitzgerald testimony, interview
memoranda

The AMHS # case officer

same w/ synchro stuff

Interview 67 FBR staff & internal
docs
also

21 p 249 Book II - reference to 67 FBR
wherein case officer Amlesh
ordered to break contact w/

Amlesh due to loss of JFK
77 FBR says 67 FBR states that
case officer got cable from City saying
"everything was off" - but case
officer didn't state that reason
for everything being off was JFK's
assassination.

22 OPM cable never found - it may never
have been sent being case officer
misrecollection. FBR says 2
sources in Book II don't support its
version

11111960

p. n 30, p 17 Book II - ? of Amlesh's security
not until after JFK was was ? of
security of sufficient concern for CIA
to make a decision of him

23 Amlesh was CIA station - New York
advising - at 10:40 am of 30 June
departure - The House - with letters - Amlesh
did not find out of CIA until 3/61 - 11/64

p 269 Book II - re Amalash name as
 known contact of Soviet
 in Mex Cy - Amalash
 real name in list of
 names on the Mex Cy cable
 above used as basis for Book II
 discussion of why Amalash name
 in list did not lead to identification
 of Amalash operation

- 27 Amalash name brought up by Soviet
 embassy official and Cuban cultural
 attache in 12/60 re Amalash planned
 press conference in Mex Cy 2/61-3/61
 and a report of contact between Amalash
 and the Soviet which was subject of
 inquiry -
 the 12/60 removes the question from
 relevance to subject because before
 Kennedy coming.

p 72 of Book II re 7/64 FBI report
 concerning CIA meeting w/ Amalash
 FBI report says meeting was to plan
 Castro assas. - badly misrep
 time & events - substantially post
 date JFK death & not relevant to
 WC inquiry

- 25 p 75 Book II re testimony of Chief SAS/CE
 recollections uncertain. Book II
 gives his opinion re Castro assas by
 Amalash full play despite question
 of reliability to the probability

25

p 68-75 Book I re what CIA people knew about Amtrak, what was understood and conclusion that should have been drawn
TFR says Book I overlooks intricate quality of Amtrak relationship during the period in question

26

p 78, 79, 105 Book I re Cuban exile designated A who informed FBI + CIA in mid-65 of Amtrak activities + A's relationship w/ CIA. TFR says if read Book I carefully it is clear that 'A' was unaware of Amtrak's assoc. w/ CIA

- 1) info was 1 1/2 yrs after JFK's ass.
- 2) informant had no knowledge of earlier CIA / Amtrak relationship

27

28

" At the time of the 1967 FS report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that toward the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was informal and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an accommodation about the treatment of the Cuban exile. The 1967 Report is both impressionistic and misleading. It

AMUS?

TAB F

Materials Forwarded TO WARREN
COMMISSION AND FBI

Listed here are reports and other papers
submitted to the FBI (which had primary
responsibility for the investigation) and the
the Warren Commission.

4 sections to the list

F.1 Dissem to Intell. Community

F.2 Dissem to WC.

SECRET

E3 Dissen to FBI on Rumors & Allegations

E4 Memoranda to W.C.

F 2

18

Dissemination of Reports to CIA Staff

"Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, all cable traffic (theoretical) including dissemination by cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Additionally, cable dissemination was released by CI/LIAISON. Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff.

Since CI Staff released all long-form CSCI's, coordination with short-form CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log, the CI Staff received copies of all CSCI's.

18

Dissem. of Material to W.C.

19	<u>C.D.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>NOT C.D.'S</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Subj</u>	<u>D/D</u>
	100	12/13/63		1/21/64	memo from Helms	
	300	1/21/64			to J. L. Rankin	
	1091	1/22/64			re: Draft 2's	
	321	1/25/64		2/5/64	for submission	
	347	1/31/64			to Soviet Out	
	361	2/5/64			note from Kara-	
					messengers to Rankin	
					1.4 attachments	
					including recent	
					Soviet States, on	
					L-110.	
20	1182	2/8/64		2/18/64	memo from FBI	
					denied	
					Adm. Sec. Paper	
					Copy 104	

28 22 July 1964 DDP 4-3712 C.D. 1273
Memo from Helms, DDP to Rankin
Subject: Apparent inconsistencies in
Material Furnished the Commis-
sion by CIA and the Department
of State

29 11 September 1964 DDP 4-4793
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished
to the Commission by the CIA

32 13 Oct. 1964 DDP 4-5275
Memo from DDP Helms to Rankin
Subject: Public. of Docs furnished
to Commission by CIA

	DOC. DATE	DOC NO.	ORIGINATING OFFICE
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1	11/23/63	DIR 84915	(WH/3)
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Info relates to telephone call on 9/28/63
to Soviet Embassy in Mex Cy. Request
FBI

2

41111264

Tab E - Material Forwarded to W.C.

Tab F - Mex City Coverage of Oswald's Visit

Intel. Sources on Oswald's Visit
to Mex City 63

umbrella type
project

1. Unilateral Coverage

{ LIPSTICK - multi-line phone taps
3 photo sites, mobile surveillance
team + mail intercept operation

LIFEAT - telephone taps -

- handled by case officer
+ recruited agents

3 photographic site subscripts
under LIPSTICK

managed
by a Mex agent

{ LIMITED - fixed to directly of route
Soviet Embassy
LILYRIC - alternate photo base same
street as LIMITED fine gate
LICALLA - Southwest side of Soviet Compound
backdoor - get good TD photos
of Soviet personnel

2

closed down when Station received word
that photo of the "unidentified man"
was being released by W.C.

Film collected 3 times/week from
LIMITED and LILYRIC sites
LICALLA film processed in outside
by the agent like the above

3 mobile surveillance done by 2 American
staff officers - had team of 6 recruited
agents - team could be activated by
radio from LIMITED site whenever necessary
of interest left the Soviet Embassy

3. unilateral mail intercept; Libright - handled by American case officer

Seam Coverage

unreliable because as was the nature of Mexican Secret at the time

4. Telephone tap w/ Mexicans called Lienvoy run by Mex office - 30 lines on the listening post. In 61 Station chief became project case officer on LIENVOY

Oswald Coverage

Mexicans asked for telephone numbers of Soviet, Cuban & Satellite Embassies to do Lienvoy tap - we disconnected our unilateral lines toward discovery. Mex connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech lines, 2 Polish lines, and 1 Yugoslav line - recorded, transcribed

plus monthly modest summaries for Station chief of interesting conversations
time lag of a day or two

5. Boris Yarosoff and Russian translation translation ran about a week behind date of conversation. All transcripts made in Spanish or English since this is all Stalkief could read & because he ordered other transcripts for operations

- 6 Anna Goodpastore sent a screencast photograph as soon as station learned that Lee Oswald had joined Soviet Embassy.
- 7 Oswald came to attention of listening post operators from tap of Soviet line. It was picked up & taken to B. Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel wanted to review the photograph, coincidentally w/ the typed transcript.

Tab G

Selected Newspaper Stories w/ Comment
(45) - Comments on Ronald Nease's Wash Post article of 11/26/76
re CIA w/ held details of Oswald's call

- 2 memo - J. Lee Rankin 3/24/64 for PPP Helms
Subject: CIA Dissem of Info on LHO
date 10/10/63

2/ Memo for Rankin from Helms 1/31/64
re Info developed by CIA on
LHO activities in Mex 9/28-10/3/63

- 3/ Letter to Helms 2/10/64 from Rankin
4/ Memo for Rankin 2/19/64 from
Helms - re Info on LHO Mex, Helms
9/28/ - 10/3/63

Tab H & w/ CIA comments

1. Jack Anderson column 5/6/77 alleges CIA activity in Dallas in 1963
2. " " " 1/20/77 alleging CIA told to false Oswald story
3. Norman Kempster story 1/1/77 alleging CIA w/ held date on Oswald
4. Clark Booth Luce involvement w/ Cuban exile
5. Ronald Kessler story 11/26/76 alleging CIA w/ held details of Oswald's telephone calls, w/ report on handling of documents
6. John Goshko story 11/13/76 alleging Oswald told Cubans of plans to kill Kennedy
7. Tabloid Midnight story 8/2/76 regarding CIA & Castro
8. Wash Post story 10/1/76 re CIA consideration of possibly interviewing LHO in 1960